{"product_id":"1866-at-the-end-was-the-battle-of-koniggratz","title":"1866 - At the End was the Battle of Koeniggratz","description":"\u003cp\u003eThe scholarly inquiry of the causes of Austrias defeat in 1866 is almost as\nold as the war against rising Prussia itself. Already in the immediate\naftermath of the conflict, considerable energy was devoted to identifying the\nsources of failure. At the time, responsibility was attributed to the\nmisjudgements of the high command, and above all to the commander-in-chief of\nthe k.k. North Army, Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek. This one-sided\ninterpretation, together with the broader debate surrounding the so-called\nquestion of guilt (Schuldfrage), was later treated with increasing nuance.\nDuring the twentieth century, historians sought the origins of the defeat at\nboth political and military levels. From a military perspective, research has\nprimarily examined developments in armaments technology, the (strategic-)\noperational miscalculations of the campaign, and the structural deficiencies of\nthe k.k. Army, which stemmed in large part from severe budgetary restrictions.\nBy contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to battle tactics.\nIn 1866, Austria entered the war against Prussia with a tactical doctrine\nnearly sixty years old, based on an overestimation of the historical tradition\nof military values. \u003cbr\u003e\nThis volume examines precisely this neglected aspect. Within the broader\ncontext of armed conflicts since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars against\nFrance, it introduces and systematically analyses Austrian military doctrine,\nwith particular emphasis on tactics. The study critically examines the outdated\nsystems of recruitment and training, while also considering the related fields\nof uniforms and equipment, soldiers daily life, and military communication. The\ninvestigation, however, focuses primarily on two main themes: first, the\nAustrians disdain for the employment of firearms; and second, their unshakeable\nbelief in the invincibility of their own close-order battle formations. The\nbayonet charge, in particular, was accorded a special and almost emblematic\nstatus. The volume further explores the interaction between the various arms in\nwartime and highlights the complex interrelationship between strategic and\ntactical concepts. It becomes clear that the k.k. Austrian Army was among the\nvery last of the truly Napoleonic forces; an army whose admirable courage could\nno longer compensate for hopelessly outdated infantry tactics in the age of\nindustrialised warfare.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Zeughausverlag GmbH","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":57297019240792,"sku":"9783963600746","price":43.99,"currency_code":"EUR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0278\/1295\/4195\/files\/9783963600746.jpg?v=1780119957","url":"https:\/\/agendabookshop.com\/products\/1866-at-the-end-was-the-battle-of-koniggratz","provider":"Agenda Bookshop","version":"1.0","type":"link"}