Case for Idealism

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A01=John Foster
anti-realism
Author_John Foster
Berkeley
Berkeley's Account
Berkeley’s Account
Category=QD
Constructive Project
epistemology of experience
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Esse Est Percipi
Experiential Constraints
Functional Geometry
Genuine Space
Geometrical Structure
Human Sense Experience
Idealism
Intrinsic Geometry
Intrinsic Nature
logical construction of reality
Logically Created
Logically Sustained
Mentalistic Realism
metaphysics
mind-body problem
natural law
Phenomenal Time
phenomenalism
phenomenalist philosophy
Philosophical thinking
philosophy of perception
Physical Beliefs
Physical Geometry
physical realism
Psychophysical Laws
Reductive Phenomenalism
RPV
Sensual Geometry
Spatiotemporal Arrangement
topic-neutrality
Transcendental Thesis
Transparently Conceivable
Ultimate Reality
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367720261
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 14 Apr 2021
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Originally published in 1982, the aim of this book is a controversial one – to refute, by the most rigorous philosophical methods, physical realism and to develop and defend in its place a version of phenomenalism. Physical realism here refers to the thesis that the physical world (or some selected portion of it) is an ingredient of ultimate reality, where ultimate reality is the totality of those entities and facts which are not logically sustained by anything else. Thus, in arguing against physical realism, the author sets out to establish that ultimate reality is wholly non-physical. The crucial elements in this argument are the topic-neutrality of physical description and the relationship between physical geometry and natural law.

The version of phenomenalism advanced by John Foster develops out of this refutation of physical realism. Its central claim is that the physical world is the logical creation of the natural (non-logical) constraints on human sense-experience. This phenomenalist perspective assumes that there is some form of time in which human experience occurs but which is logically prior to the physical world, and Foster explores in detail the nature of this pre-physical time and its relation to time as a framework for physical events.

This book was a major contribution to contemporary philosophical thinking at the time.

John Foster

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