Corporate Governance

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A Random Walk Down Wall Street
A01=Jonathan R. Macey
Abuse of authority
Accounting scandals
Accredited investor
Activist shareholder
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Agency cost
Alternative trading system
Andrew Fastow
Anti-Takeover Statute
Arthur Levitt
Auditor
Author_Jonathan R. Macey
automatic-update
Bank failure
Barriers to entry
Board of directors
Bribery
Burton Malkiel
Business ethics
Business failure
Business Roundtable
Buy-sell agreement
Buyback
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=KJR
Chiarella v. United States
Class action
Collusion
Comparative advantage
COP=United States
Corporate crime
Corporate governance
Corporate law
Corporate raid
Corporation
Credit (finance)
Cronyism
Defensive Acquisition
Defensive strategy
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
Derivative suit
Directors and officers liability insurance
Economic planning
Economics
Empire-building
Employment
Enron
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Equity Funding
Executive compensation
False Claims Act
Finance
Fraud
Golden parachute
Greenmail
Hedge fund
High-yield debt
Hostile Takeover Bid
Impossibility
Independent director
Information asymmetry
Insider trading
Insolvency
Institutional investor
Investment
Investment Advice
Investment company
Investment Company Act of 1940
Investor
Job security
Laddering
Language_English
Late trading
Litigation Risk
Management entrenchment
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nexus of contracts
PA=Available
Plaintiff
Ponzi scheme
Price_€20 to €50
Private equity
PS=Active
Public company
Put option
Race to the bottom
Restructuring
Revaluation of fixed assets
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Securities Act of 1933
Share price
Share repurchase
Shareholder
Shareholder rights plan
softlaunch
State actor
Takeover
Tax
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
The Nature of the Firm
The Wealth Effect
Unconscionability
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
Whistleblower

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691148021
  • Weight: 482g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 12 Dec 2010
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
  • Language: English
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Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation--not more--is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences. Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds. Corporate Governance reveals why the market is the best guardian of shareholder interests.
Jonathan R. Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law at Yale Law School. He is the author of a number of books, including "Macey on Corporation Laws".

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