A01=Eric Schickler
A01=Gregory Wawro
Abstention
Adjournment
Advice and consent
Amendment
American Conservative Union
Appropriation bill
Author_Eric Schickler
Author_Gregory Wawro
Bipartisanship
Blue slip
Byrd Rule
Category=JPQ
Censure
Charles Sumner
Citizens (Spanish political party)
Cloture
Committee
Concurrent majority
Constitutional amendment
Deliberation
Despotism
Direct election
Doughface
Economics
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Fred Dubois
Free silver
Gang of 14
Hidden welfare state
Huey Long
Indirect election
John M. Olin Foundation
John McCain
Legislation
Legislative veto
Legislator
Liberum veto
Lodge Bill
Logrolling
Majoritarianism
Majority
Majority rule
Midterm election
Miguel Estrada
Mr. Smith Goes to Washington
NEE
New Democrats
No Campaign (UK)
Nomination
Olympia Snowe
Opportunity cost
Party-line vote
Point of order
Political machine
Politics
Precedent
Prerogative
Previous question
Protectionism
Public Campaign
Quorum call
Reed Smoot
Senate hold
Senatorial courtesy
Silverite
Special session
Supermajority
Suspension of the rules
Two-party system
Tyranny of the majority
Veto
Vote trading
Voting
Whigs (British political party)
Product details
- ISBN 9780691134062
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 09 Sep 2007
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Parliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the "filibuster," has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate. What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes. The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules.
They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations.
Gregory J. Wawro is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. He is the author of "Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives". Eric Schickler is professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of "Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress" and coauthor of "Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identity of Voters".
