{"product_id":"moral-epistemology-of-intuitionism-1","title":"Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism","description":"\u003cp\u003eCovering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral  emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the  epistemology of moral intuitionism. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHis line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from  empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based  account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. \u003ci\u003eThe  Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism\u003c\/i\u003e combines epistemological  intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of  the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment.  The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of  understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming  and perceptual experience.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Bloomsbury Publishing PLC","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":54252879774040,"sku":"9781350297616","price":38.99,"currency_code":"EUR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0278\/1295\/4195\/files\/9781350297616.jpg?v=1770282035","url":"https:\/\/agendabookshop.com\/products\/moral-epistemology-of-intuitionism-1","provider":"Agenda Bookshop","version":"1.0","type":"link"}