Atomic Assurance

4.20 (5 ratings by Goodreads)
Regular price €61.50
Regular price €64.99 Sale Sale price €61.50
20-50
A01=Alexander Lanoszka
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alliance
alliance politics
American foreign policy
American grand strategy
Author_Alexander Lanoszka
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Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JPSF
Category=JWMN
coercion
COP=United States
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
deterrence
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eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
extended deterrence
Language_English
Nuclear
nuclear proliferation
nuclear strategy
PA=Available
Price_€50 to €100
PS=Active
SN=Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
softlaunch
strategy

Product details

  • ISBN 9781501729188
  • Weight: 907g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 15 Nov 2018
  • Publisher: Cornell University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
  • Language: English
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Do alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies.

Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than analysts have assumed; and the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States works better to reverse or to halt that ally's nuclear bid than anything else.

Crossing diplomatic history, international relations, foreign policy, grand strategy, and nuclear strategy, Lanoszka's book reworks our understanding of the power and importance of alliances in stopping nuclear proliferation.

Alexander Lanoszka is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. Previously, he taught at City, University of London and has held fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College. His research on alliance politics, theories of war, and European security has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and other academic journals. He holds a PhD from Princeton University.