Delivering on Promises
★★★★★
★★★★★
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A01=Lauren J. Peritz
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Author_Lauren J. Peritz
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Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JP
Category=LBHG
compliance
COP=United States
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eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
European Court of Justice
international cooperation
international courts
Language_English
legalization
PA=Available
Price_€50 to €100
PS=Active
softlaunch
trade politics
veto players
World Trade Organization
Product details
- ISBN 9780226822136
- Weight: 540g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 21 Dec 2022
- Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
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A timely investigation into the conditions that make international agreements—and the institutions that enforce them—vulnerable.
When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results—but they are only effective under certain conditions.
As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.
When do international institutions effectively promote economic cooperation among countries and help them resolve conflict? Although the international system lacks any central governing authority, states have created rules, particularly around international economic relations, and empowered international tribunals to enforce those rules. Just how successful are these institutions? In Delivering on Promises Lauren J. Peritz demonstrates that these international courts do indeed deliver results—but they are only effective under certain conditions.
As Peritz shows, states are less likely to comply with international rules and international court decisions when domestic industries have the political ability to obstruct compliance in particular cases. The author evaluates the argument with an extensive empirical analysis that traces the domestic politics of compliance with the decisions of two international economic courts: the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a time when international agreements are under attack, this book sheds light on the complex relationship between domestic politics and international economic cooperation, offering detailed evidence that international economic courts are effective at promoting interstate cooperation.
Lauren J. Peritz is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Davis.
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