Perceptual Experience
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A01=Christopher S. Hill
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Product details
- ISBN 9780192867766
- Weight: 586g
- Dimensions: 160 x 240mm
- Publication Date: 01 Sep 2022
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted as relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary explanation of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Hill maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. Hill also offers accounts of the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experiences can possess. One aim is to argue that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher-level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support.
Christopher S. Hill is Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He previously held teaching positions at Case Western Reserve University and the University of Arkansas. He has had visiting appointments at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Michigan, and MIT. He is the author of several books, including Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (OUP, 2014) and a number of articles.
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