Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation

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A01=Craig M. White
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agency theory
Agent Knowledge
agent-centered moral responsibility
Alfred's Act
Aristotelian Thomist View
Author_Craig M. White
automatic-update
Bennett's Examples
Book III
Capital Punishment
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HP
Category=HPQ
Category=HRQA
Category=QDHH
Category=QDTQ
Causally Involved
COP=United Kingdom
Craig M. White
Day's End
De Villefort
Defensive Killing
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
Double Effect Reasoning
Edward's Leg
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
ethics of self-defense
Future Facts
Good Life
Greco Roman Wrestler
IIP
Impermissible Act
inner states
Innocent Aggressor
Innocent Threat
intention-based evaluation
intentions
Jonathan Bennett
Judith Thomson
just war ethics
just war theory
Karl's Death
knowledge
Language_English
moral acts
moral evaluation of acts
moral permissibility
moral psychology
normative ethics
Objective Approach
Objective Moral Theorists
PA=Available
Para-act Status
philosophy of action
Price_€20 to €50
PS=Active
softlaunch
Thomson's Account
trolley problem
Vice Versa
volition

Product details

  • ISBN 9781032298269
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 26 Aug 2024
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
  • Language: English
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This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent’s inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, "objective" approach in normative ethics.

It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label "agent," must be engaged during an act if its moral evaluation is to be coherent. The author begins with an ontological argument that an act is a motion or a causing of change in something else. He argues that the source of an act’s moral meaning is in the agent: specifically, what the agent, if aware of relevant facts around her, aims to accomplish. He then moves to a series of critical chapters that consider arguments for mainstream approaches to act evaluation, including Thomson’s dismissal of the agent knowledge and volition requirements, Scanlon’s arguments for a derivative relevance of intentions to permissibility, Frowe’s "causal roles" of agents in the moral evaluation of acts, and Bennett’s explicit defense of the objective approach. The book concludes by offering the author’s preferred replacement for the objective approach, an Aristotelian-Thomist view of acts.

Acts, Intentions, and Moral Evaluation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, just war theory, the ethics of self-defense, and philosophy of action.

Craig M. White has been a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado Boulder, USA. He is the author of Iraq: The Moral Reckoning (2010). A former US diplomat, he served for 20 years in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

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