Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory
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A01=Yasushi Asako
advanced electoral strategy research
Air Force
Ambiguous Promises
Author_Yasushi Asako
binding platforms
Category=JPHF
Category=KCC
Category=PBUD
Competition Model
Concave Issue
Concave Utility Functions
Condorcet Winner
Electoral Promises
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Extreme Candidate
Extreme Type
fairness and impossibility theorems
formal political modelling
game theoretic analysis
game theory
game theory models
Ideal Policy
Linear Utility Functions
Median Policy
Median Voters
Multiple Policy Dimensions
Nash equilibria
Opponent's Promise
Opponent’s Promise
policy signalling mechanisms
Political Ambiguity
political commitment theory
political science
Probabilistic Voting
rational choice theory
social dilemmas
strategic candidate positioning
strategy
voter behaviour analysis
zero-sum and combinatorial games
Product details
- ISBN 9780367444242
- Weight: 280g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 24 Sep 2020
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises.
The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories.
Yasushi Asako is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.
