1997 Asian financial crisis
A01=Jonathan Kirshner
Agadir Crisis
Appeasement
Austerity
Author_Jonathan Kirshner
Bank
Bank of Japan
Budget
Cambridge University Press
Capital control
Capital flight
Capitalism
Category=JPS
Category=JW
Category=KFF
Charles P. Kindleberger
Currency
Deflation
Devaluation
Disarmament
Economic growth
Economic history of Japan
Economic policy
Economics
Economy
Economy of Japan
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Exchange rate
Expense
Falklands Crisis (1770)
Financial crisis
Financial distress
Financial fragility
Foreign policy
French franc
Global financial system
Government debt
Government spending
Grand strategy
Great power
Imperialism
Inflation
Interest rate
International finance
International relations
Jingoism
Joseph Caillaux
Keynesian economics
Liberalism
Liberalization
Margaret Thatcher
Marshall Plan
Monetarism
Monetary policy
Money
National security
National Security Strategy (United States)
Nixon shock
NSC-68
Opportunity cost
Pacifism
Partial equilibrium
Political economy
Politician
Power politics
Princeton University Press
Security dilemma
Sovereignty
Tax
The Economist
The Other Hand
Tories (British political party)
War
War cabinet
World War I
Product details
- ISBN 9780691134611
- Weight: 340g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 28 Oct 2007
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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In Appeasing Bankers, Jonathan Kirshner shows that bankers dread war--an aversion rooted in pragmatism, not idealism. "Sound money, not war" is hardly a pacifist rallying cry. The financial world values economic stability above all else, and crises and war threaten that stability. States that pursue appeasement when assertiveness--or even conflict--is warranted, Kirshner demonstrates, are often appeasing their own bankers. And these realities are increasingly shaping state strategy in a world of global financial markets. Yet the role of these financial preferences in world politics has been widely misunderstood and underappreciated. Liberal scholars have tended to lump finance together with other commercial groups; theorists of imperialism (including, most famously, Lenin) have misunderstood the preferences of finance; and realist scholars have failed to appreciate how the national interest, and proposals to advance it, are debated and contested by actors within societies. Finance's interest in peace is both pronounced and predictable, regardless of time or place.
Bankers, Kirshner shows, have even opposed assertive foreign policies when caution seems to go against their nation's interest (as in interwar France) or their own long-term political interest (as during the Falklands crisis, when British bankers failed to support their ally Margaret Thatcher). Examining these and other cases, including the Spanish-American War, interwar Japan, and the United States during the Cold War, Appeasing Bankers shows that, when faced with the prospect of war or international political crisis, national financial communities favor caution and demonstrate a marked aversion to war.
Jonathan Kirshner is professor of government at Cornell University.
