Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1956–1975

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A01=Moshe Gat
Arab Israeli Conflict
Author_Moshe Gat
Category=GTM
Category=JP
Category=JPWS
Category=NHG
Cold War diplomacy
comparative foreign policy
Deep Penetration Bombings
Egyptian Air Force
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
government
Interim Agreement
international conflict resolution
Israeli Air Force
Israeli Government
Israeli Shipping
Israeli Syrian Border
June Lines
Lake Tiberias
Levi Eshkol
Middle Eastern politics
military strategy analysis
Muslim Worlds
National Water Carrier
postwar Middle East peace process
Rogers Plan
Sharm El Sheikh
Sinai Campaign
Sinai Desert
Sinai II
Sinai Ii Agreement
Suez Campaign
superpower intervention
Syrian Air Force
Syrian MiGs
United States
Yemen Civil War
Young Men

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138093324
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 20 Nov 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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The Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1956–1975 contains a collection of articles that examine select issues between the end of the Suez Campaign in November 1956 and the Sinai II, or Interim Agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt in September 1975.

The book provides a comprehensive overview of the struggle between the three superpowers – the UK, the United States and the Soviet Union – and the effects this had on the region. It also explores the circumstances that led to the Six Day War in June 1967, such as the use of air power and the Israeli retaliatory raids. Two chapters look at the two leaders during the war: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the Arab world – a charismatic and dominant persona – and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, considered weak and inconspicuous. Three chapters focus on the period between the two wars – June 1967 and October 1973 – and one explores the aftermath. Emphasis is placed on Israeli policy between 1967 and 1973, which primarily focused on the use of military power and foreign policy inaction. It is argued that it was this policy that hindered all progress in the peace process, and ultimately led, among other factors, to the Yom Kippur War. The final chapter is on Kissinger and the road to the Sinai II Agreement. It discusses the huge shift in American policy – from avoiding a significant role in the prevention of an imminent war during May and June of 1967, to deep involvement in every detail of the dispute during and following the Yom Kippur War.

Providing an in-depth examination of this important period of the Arab–Israeli conflict, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Middle Eastern History and Politics, Conflict Studies and International Relations.

Moshe Gat is Professor Emeritus of Political Studies and European Modern History. He was formerly Head of History Department and Head of Political Studies Department at Bar Ilan University, Israel

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