Auctions
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And Interest
Anecdotal evidence
Arbitrage
At Best
Auction
Auction Market
Auction theory
Author_Paul Klemperer
Average Price
Bargaining
Bertrand paradox (economics)
Bidding
Bribery
Calculation
Category=KC
Category=KNP
Collusion
Competitive advantage
Cost curve
Cournot competition
Credit (finance)
Customer
Deadweight loss
Discounting
Double auction
Dutch auction
Economic problem
Economic surplus
Economics
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Expected utility hypothesis
Externality
Finance
First-price sealed-bid auction
Guarantee
Industry Group
Investment
Lock-in (decision-making)
Long run and short run
Lump sum
Mainstream economics
Marginal cost
Market power
Mechanism design
Misrepresentation
Negative cost
Oligopoly
Perfect competition
Policy
Price Change
Price discrimination
Price fixing
Principal-agent problem
Protectionism
Purchase Price
Real estate appraisal
Relative valuation
Reseller
Revenue
Reverse auction
Risk aversion
Ronald Coase
Scarcity
Securicor
Share price
Shortage
Spectrum auction
Speculation
Subsidy
Tax
Vertical integration
Vickrey auction
Winner's curse
Product details
- ISBN 9780691119250
- Weight: 369g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 28 Mar 2004
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes.
Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Paul Klemperer is the Edgeworth Professor of Economics at Oxford University and a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Econometric Society.
