A01=Richard Moran
Akrasia
Ambiguity
Ambivalence
Anxiety
Apprehension (understanding)
Arbitrariness
Asymmetry
Author_Richard Moran
Awareness
Category=JMS
Category=QDTM
Censure
Concept
Consciousness
Contingency (philosophy)
Cowardice
Criticism
Direct and indirect realism
Disposition
Egocentric predicament
Epistemic virtue
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
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eq_society-politics
Equivocation
Explanation
Expressivism
Externalism
Facticity
Falsity
Feeling
Foundationalism
Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Holism
Incorrigibility
Indication (medicine)
Inference
Intention
Intimidation
Introspection
Irrationality
Minimisation (psychology)
Moore's paradox
Moral psychology
Morality
Objectivity (philosophy)
Overreaction
Paradox
Phenomenon
Philosopher
Philosophical language
Practical reason
Prediction
Pride
Problem of other minds
Rationality
Reality
Reason
Sanity
Self-awareness
Self-consciousness
Self-deception
Self-knowledge (psychology)
Shame
Skepticism
Solipsism
State of affairs (philosophy)
Substance theory
Suggestion
Symptom
Theory
Thought
Train of thought
Uncertainty
Understanding
Wishful thinking
Product details
- ISBN 9780691089454
- Weight: 340g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 18 Nov 2001
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of "first-person authority"--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator.
He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being "objective" toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others.
Richard Moran is Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University.
