A01=Colin F. Camerer
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Author_Colin F. Camerer
Backward induction
Bayesian
Behavioral economics
Behavioral game theory
Bidding
Bribery
Calculation
Category=JMAL
Category=KCA
Category=KJC
Category=PBUD
Centipede game
Common knowledge (logic)
Competition
Cooperative game
Coordination failure (economics)
Coordination game
Customer
Decision-making
Dictator game
Economic equilibrium
Economics
Economist
Employment
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eq_business-finance-law
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Estimation
Experiment
Experimental economics
Extensive-form game
Externality
Forecasting
Game show
Incentive
Inference
Information asymmetry
Investor
Iteration
Learning
Nash equilibrium
Negotiation
Option value (cost-benefit analysis)
Outcome (game theory)
Pareto efficiency
Payment
Percentage
Prediction
Preference (economics)
Principal-agent problem
Probability
Psychology
Quantal response equilibrium
Quantity
Randomization
Ratchet effect
Rational expectations
Rationality
Reinforcement
Reinforcement learning
Repayment
Reputation
Result
Risk aversion
Self-interest
Sequential equilibrium
Signaling game
Social preferences
Stag hunt
Statistic
Strategic thinking
Strategy (game theory)
Theory
Ultimatum game
Uncertainty
Utility
Product details
- ISBN 9780691090399
- Weight: 907g
- Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 17 Mar 2003
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks ..." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions.
Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Colin F. Camerer is Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of Technology. The author of numerous journal articles and book chapters, he teaches both cognitive psychology and economics.
