A01=Michael Bacharach
Act utilitarianism
Altruism
Amos Tversky
At Best
Author_Michael Bacharach
Backward induction
Bayesian probability
Bounded rationality
Category=KCA
Causality
Common knowledge (logic)
Consequentialism
Cooperative game
Coordination game
Decision-making
Deontic logic
Disposition
Dynamic programming
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Equiprobability
Evidentialism
Explanation
Explanatory power
Extensive-form game
Externality
Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Good and evil
Grandiosity
Groupthink
Heuristic
Holism
Hypothesis
In-group favoritism
Infinite regress
Intention
Interdependence
John Harsanyi
Magical thinking
Martin Hollis (philosopher)
Meta-analysis
Mutual exclusivity
Nash equilibrium
Normative
Obedience (human behavior)
Occam's razor
Pareto efficiency
Polite fiction
Preference (economics)
Preference relation
Principal-agent problem
Principle
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Rationalizability
Reason
Reciprocal altruism
Risk aversion
Self-concept
Self-interest
Selfishness
Social dilemma
Solution concept
Sophistication
Stag hunt
State of nature
Suggestion
Theory
Theory of the second best
Thought
Utilitarianism
Utility
Product details
- ISBN 9780691120058
- Weight: 454g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 07 May 2006
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal.
Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole.
Michael Bacharach (1936 - 2002) was Professor of Economics at Oxford University, where he was also Director of the Bounded Rationality in Economic Behavior Research Unit. His books included the present work, which he was completing at the time of his death in 2002, and Economics and the Theory of Games. Natalie Gold is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling Group at the University of Konstanz. Robert Sugden, Professor of Economics at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, is the author of The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare and the co-author of The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis and The Theory of Choice.
