Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States

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A01=Jay Ryu
Agency Budget Requests
Author_Jay Ryu
Balanced Budget Requirements
Budget Decision Makers
Budget Inertia
Budget Punctuations
Budget Resolutions
Budget Stability
Category=JPP
Category=JPQB
CBO Staff
CBO's Scoring
CBO’s Scoring
Central Budget Offices
centralization in government
Disproportionate Information Processing Theory
Enhance Information Processing Capacity
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Executive Budget
Executive Budget Process
Executive Budgeting Systems
executive legislative budget dynamics
Expedite Information Processing
fiscal policy analysis
Information Processing Capacity
institutional conflict resolution
Institutional Frictions
Jay Eungha Ryu
Main Budget Actors
Omb Budget Examiner
Omb Staff
organizational decision making
Partisan Configurations
performance budgeting reform
Performance Budgeting Systems
public administration theory
State Budget Processes
State Executive Budget

Product details

  • ISBN 9781412842891
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 15 Oct 2011
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Inc
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Bureaucracies have been criticized from various perspectives and blamed for a variety of failings. Critics have claimed that bureaucracies are too focused on conforming to rules rather than achieving an organization's core mission. Bureaucracies are said to oppress human freedom because of their orientation toward hierarchical control. Bureaucratic organizations are also said to be unable to deal effectively with public problems that span multiple administrative jurisdictions; they do not reach beyond their own organizational boundaries.

This book provides solid data on how bureaucracies can expedite information processing and reduce organizational conflicts. Jay Eungha Ryu finds that the functions of bureaucracies are highly dependent upon external political conditions. Whether the executive and legislative branches are dominated by the same party significantly influences the ability of bureaucracies to function effectively.

Ryu notes that the merits of bureaucratic centralization are worth close attention. Numerous attempts, including performance budgeting systems, have been made to improve bureaucratic malfunctions. However, such reform initiatives are doomed to failure, he argues, unless they employ a core feature of bureaucracy itself, centralization. Ryu defines bureaucratic centralization at its best as bounded bureaucracy. If well managed, bounded bureaucracy can substantially improve the rational behavior of organizations and reduce institutional frictions.

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