Bureaucratic Struggle For Control Of U.s. Foreign Aid
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A01=Caleb Rossiter
Africa Bureau
Aid Programming
AID's Office
American Oda
Author_Caleb Rossiter
Basic Human
bureaucratic struggle
Carter administration
Category=JP
Civil War
Commodity Import Program
development assistance strategies
Developmental Goals
DSB.
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
executive branch decision making
Export Import Bank
foreign aid policy analysis
Foreign Assistance Act
interagency conflict
International Monetary Fund
Mutual Security Act
Oda Level
Oda Program
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Private Voluntary Organizations
Rhodesia Zimbabwe case study
Security Assistance
South Viet Namese Army
southern Africa development
Southern African
Southern African Policy
Title II
Title Ii Program
Title Iii
U.S. aid bureaucracy in southern Africa
U.S. foreign-aid programs
U.S. government agencies
United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
World War III
Product details
- ISBN 9780367305932
- Weight: 490g
- Dimensions: 144 x 233mm
- Publication Date: 31 May 2021
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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This study of executive-branch decision making explores the conflict between the diplomatic and developmental mandates of U.S. foreign-aid programs on two levels. First, a given amount of programming funded for a country must be divided among various activities, some of which are directed toward long-term development while others encourage short-term diplomatic cooperation with U.S. initiatives. Second, individual federal agencies favor certain types of aid and are engaged in a constant struggle to preserve and expand their favored programs at the expense of others. Dr. Rossiter examines this conflict in a case study of the State Department's use of foreign-aid programs to induce the "frontline" states of southern Africa to cooperate with President Carter's initiative to resolve the civil war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. According to Dr. Rossiter, the Agency for International Development (AID) lost control over foreign aid in the region to the State Department because the constituency for development objectives was relatively weak, both inside and outside the U.S. government. He concludes by discussing the implications of AID's unsuccessful attempt to free itself from the State Department's control during the reorganization of the foreign-aid bureaucracy under President Carter.
Caleb Rossiter is on the staff of the bipartisan Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, where his duties focus on legislation and research related to U.S. economic and military policy in the Third World. He has been an adjunct professor of military policy at Cornell University's Washington, D.C., campus. Dr. Rossiter has written on U.S. foreign policy for the Congressional Research Service and the Center for International Policy, where he is a fellow. He conducted interviews with more than seventy officials in various U.S. government agencies in preparation for this book.
