Causation and Universals
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A01=Evan Fales
Armstrong's Account
Armstrong's Theory
Armstrong’s Account
Armstrong’s Theory
Author_Evan Fales
Backward Causation
Black's Universe
Black’s Universe
Boyle Charles Law
Bundle Theory
Category=QDTJ
causal
Causal Powers
Causal Relations
Causally Sufficient
chain
Constant Conjunction
demon
empirical knowledge theory
Enumerative Induction
Epistemic Probability
epistemological internalism
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
evil
Evil Demon Hypothesis
Generic Universals
hypothesis
Locational Universals
metaphysics of science
monadic
Monadic Properties
nominalism versus realism
Peircean Limit
physical laws ontology
Physical Universals
powers
property
relations
Resemblance Nominalism
scientific induction analysis
second-order relations in causation
Spatiotemporal Location
Speckled Hen
Subjunctive Conditionals
temporal
Vice Versa
Violate
Warranted Assertibility
Product details
- ISBN 9781138969988
- Weight: 710g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 08 Jul 2016
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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The world contains objective causal relations and universals, both of which are intimately connected. If these claims are true, they must have far-reaching consequences, breathing new life into the theory of empirical knowledge and reinforcing epistemological realism. Without causes and universals, Professor Fales argues, realism is defeated, and idealism or scepticism wins. Fales begins with a detailed analysis of David Hume's argument that we have no direct experience of necessary connections between events, concluding that Hume was mistaken on this fundamental point. Then, adopting the view of Armstrong and others that causation is grounded in a second-order relation between universals, he explores a range of topics for which the resulting analysis of causation has systematic implications. In particular, causal identity conditions for physical universals are proposed, which generate a new argument for Platonism. The nature of space and time is discussed, with arguments against backward causation and for the view that space and time can exist independently of matter or causal process. Many of Professor Fales's conclusions seem to run counter to received opinion among contemporary empiricists. Yet his method is classically empiricist in spirit, and a chief motive for these metaphysical explorations is epistemological. The final chapters investigate the perennial question of whether an empiricist, internalist and foundational epistemology can support scientific realism.
