A01=Michael J. Rubach
activism
Author_Michael J. Rubach
Category=KFFM
Category=KJV
Chief Investment Officers
corporate governance research
Defined Benefit Plans
Effective Monitors
empirical study of US institutional investors
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Firm's Financial Capital
Future Longitudinal Work
governance
institutional
institutional investor behavior
Institutional Owners
Institutional Shareholder Activism
investing
Investment Philosophy
Large Blockholders
Long Term Stock Price Performance
management
Measure Performance Success
mutual fund influence
passive versus active ownership
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
pension fund activism
performance
portfolio
Portfolio Performance
Positive Stock Price Reaction
Private Pension Funds
Private Pension Plans
Public Pension Plans
relationship
Relationship Building Mechanisms
Relationship Investing
shareholder
Shareholder Activism
shareholder proposal analysis
Shareholder Proposals
Stewardship Theory
Stock Return Performance
top
Product details
- ISBN 9780815335023
- Weight: 530g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 01 Oct 1999
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Inc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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This book examines the shareholder activism of institutional investors, and the effect of this activism on portfolio performance. By focusing on 118 institutional investors headquartered in the United States, the book is unique in addressing the shareholder activism of a large sample. Institutional shareholder activism is defined to include both traditional mechanisms of influence (i.e. filing shareholder proposals) and relationship investing. Institutional owners included private and public pension funds, mutual funds, bank trusts, insurance companies, endowments, and foundations. These institutional owners differ substantially, and these differences lead institutions to use their ownership power to pursue different philosophies and actions. Some institutions follow a passive governance policy, While others adopt an activist role. This book seeks to answer four questions: (1) Are institutional owners actively involved in the strategic affairs of companies in their portfolios? (2)Which forms of activism do institutional owners employ (either confrontational mechanisms, such as filing shareholder proposals, or relationship building mechanisms)? (3)Which forms of activism employed are most effective? and (4) Does the institutional type affect its pursuit of shareholder activism? In answering these questions the author suggests new important results that in many cases are contrary to what prior reports of the activities by a small number of institutional owners may intimate.
