Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War

Regular price €210.80
Quantity:
Ships in 10-20 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
Shipping & Delivery
316th Division
50th
55th Army
A01=Edward C. O'Dowd
army
Author_Edward C. O'Dowd
cai
Cambodian Resistance
Cao Bang
Category=GTM
Category=JP
Category=JWA
Category=NHF
Category=NHW
CCP
Chinese 165th Division
Cold War Asia
Eighth Route Army
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Friendship Pass
General Political Department
Guangzhou Military Region
Highway 1A
Indochina War
Khieu Samphan
Khmer Rouge
lang
Lang Son
Le Duan
Maoist military strategy critique
military doctrine analysis
Military Region
Peng Dehuai
People's Liberation Army
PLA Leadership
PLA Unit
Pol Pot
political
political commissar system
Political Work System
regional security studies
sino
Sino Vietnamese Border
son
Southeast Asian conflicts
system
Thai Cambodian Border
Vietnamese Defenders
work

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415414272
  • Weight: 630g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 19 Apr 2007
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events.

The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion.

Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general.

Edward C. O’Dowd holds the Major General Matthew C. Horner Chair of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, Quantico.

More from this author