Choice for Europe

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A01=Andrew Moravcsik
Author_Andrew Moravcsik
bargaining
Category=JPHC
Category=JPSN
Category=NHTB
cleavages
De Gaulle
Delors Committee
domestic
economic interdependence
EFTA Country
Em
Em Membership
Empty Chair Crisis
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
european
European Monetary Integration
European political economy
Fa Vo
federalism versus intergovernmentalism
Fouchet Plan
geopolitical
German Government
ideology
institutional theory
integration
Internal Market Liberalization
Internal Market Reform
interstate
Interstate Bargaining
Ludl Ow
Luxembourg Compromise
Maastricht Negotiations
Mollet Government
Monetary Integration
officials
policy coordination
Pr Ic
rational choice integration theory
Single EUROPEAN Act
Strong Currency Countries
supranational
Supranational Entrepreneurs
Supranational Officials
technocratic governance
Von Der Groeben
Weak Currency Countries

Product details

  • ISBN 9781857281927
  • Weight: 748g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 16 Nov 1998
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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The creation of the European Union arguably ranks among the most extraordinary achievements in modern world politics. Observers disagree, however, about the reasons why European governments have chosen to co- ordinate core economic policies and surrender sovereign perogatives. This text analyzes the history of the region's movement toward economic and political union. Do these unifying steps demonstrate the pre-eminence of national security concerns, the power of federalist ideals, the skill of political entrepreneurs like Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors, or the triumph of technocratic planning? Moravcsik rejects such views. Economic interdependence has been, he maintains, the primary force compelling these democracies to move in this surprising direction. Politicians rationally pursued national economic advantage through the exploitation of asymmetrical interdependence and the manipulation of institutional commitments.

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