A01=Graham T. Clews
Amphibious Operations
and the Dardanelles
Army/Navy Conflict over Continental Commitment
Author_Graham T. Clews
Borkum/Baltic
Britain's Prewar Defense Policy
Category=JWLF
Category=NHD
Category=NHWR5
Churchill
Churchill as First Lord
Churchill's Postwar Criticisms
Churchill's Support for a Large Monitor and Submarine-Building Program
Churchill's Support for Continental Commitment v. Britain's traditional Maritime Strategy
Close Blockade and Military Assault of Germany's Northern Coastline
Dardanelles
Efficacy and Nature of Naval-Only Operation against Fortified Positions
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Failure of Churchill's Northern Amphibious Operations
Greece
Impact of the Mine and Submarine on Traditional Naval Policy
Jellicoe and Churchill's Northern Schemes
Kitchener's Role in the Dardanelles Operation
Lloyd George v. Churchill (Salonika v. Dardanelles)
Mediterranean Operations v. Operations in Northern Europe
Origins of the Naval-Only Assault on the Dardanelles
Resurrection of Prewar Naval Plans
Russia
Sir John French and the Zeebrugge Operation
Western Front v. Peripheral Strategies
Zeebrugge
Product details
- ISBN 9780313384745
- Weight: 794g
- Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 13 Sep 2010
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
This book completely rewrites the history of the origins of the Dardanelles Campaign and Winston Churchill's role in it, adding a new perspective to the military and political history of World War I.
Churchill's Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign is an entirely original study of the origins of the disastrous Dardanelles Campaign of 1915 and Winston Churchill's role in it. The work challenges long-held beliefs about Churchill's actions as First Lord, including the perceptions that he had a preoccupation with the Dardanelles bordering on obsession, and that he only reluctantly promoted a naval-only attempt to force the Dardanelles because there were no troops available for a full-scale amphibious assault on the Peninsula.
Opening with a brief study of prewar naval policy in the age of the mine and submarine and the implications of the growing threat from Germany, this in-depth study shows that neither perception is true. Churchill's preoccupation was with northern Europe, not the Mediterranean. He promoted his naval-only operation because he hoped this would preempt a major British military commitment to a southern theatre that would compromise his northern aspirations. In studying the motivations that drove and the other key players in this drama, this groundbreaking work does nothing less than unlock the true origins of the Dardanelles campaign.
Graham T. Clews is a retired teacher living in Canberra, Australia.
