Civil Society and Financial Regulation

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A01=Lisa Kastner
AFL CIO President
Author_Lisa Kastner
Category=JP
Category=JPSN
Category=KCL
Category=KCP
Category=KFCP
Category=KFFH
CFPA
Civil Society
civil society impact on finance regulation
Commissioner Barnier
Consumer Protection Reforms
Diffuse Interest Groups
Diffuse Interests
ECON Committee
EPP Group
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
EU
EU Level
EU's Financial Regulation
European Union policy
EU’s Financial Regulation
Financial Industry Groups
Financial Instituitons
Financial Regulation
Financial Sector Groups
Financial Sector Lobbyists
FTT
House Financial Services Committee
Increased Issue Salience
interest group influence
Lisa Kastner
lobbying strategies
MCD
MiFID Ii
NGOs
Occupy Wall Street
post-crisis reform
Pro-reform Advocates
Pro-reform Coalitions
Pro-reform Groups
Regulation
regulatory politics
Robin Hood Tax
SME Organization
social movement theory
USA

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138634428
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 27 Oct 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Coalitions of consumer groups, NGOs, and trade unions have traditionally been considered politically weak compared to well-organized and resourceful financial sector groups which dominate or "capture" financial regulatory decisions. However, following the 2008 financial crisis, civil society groups have been seen to exert much more influence, with politicians successfully implementing financial reform in spite of industry opposition.

Drawing on literature from social movement research and regulatory politics, this book shows how diffuse interests were represented in financial regulatory overhauls in both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Four cases of reform in the post-crisis regulatory context are analyzed: the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the US; the introduction of new consumer protection regulations through EU directives; the failure of attempts to introduce a financial transaction tax in the US; and the agreement of 11 EU member states to introduce such a tax. It shows how building coalitions with important elite allies outside and inside government helped traditionally weak interest groups transcend a lack of material resources to influence and shape regulatory policy.

By engaging with a less well-known side of the debate, it explains how business power was curbed and diverse interests translated into financial regulatory policy.

Lisa Kastner is a policy advisor at the Foundation for European Progressive Studies in Brussels and associated research fellow at Sciences Po Paris. Her research on the politics of financial markets in the US and the EU was awarded the Research Award by the Erasmus academic network on Parliamentary Democracy in Europe (PADEMIA) and the Otto Hahn Medal of the Max Planck Society.

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