Collective Action

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A01=Russell Hardin
advanced collective action theory
Author_Russell Hardin
Beluga Caviar
Category=JP
Circular Reinforcement
club
Collective Action Game
Contingent Choosing
contractarianism
Coordination Equilibria
Coordination Game
dilemma
enforcement mechanisms
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Expected Utility Hypothesis
extrarational motivations
good
Group Insurance
hunt
iterated
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Large Scale Collective Action
Market Collusion
Olson's Analysis
Olson's Logic
Petersburg Paradox
play
prisoner's
Prisoner's Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma Situations
public goods theory
Pure Coordination Game
rational choice analysis
sierra
Sierra Nevadas
single
Single Play Game
Single Play Prisoner's Dilemma
social cooperation models
Social Exchange Theory
stag
Stag Hunt
Vice Versa
Voter's Paradox
West Germany

Product details

  • ISBN 9780801828195
  • Weight: 362g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 01 Jun 1982
  • Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions.
As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest.
In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns.
This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.

Russell Hardin is professor of politics at New York University. His recent books include Indeterminacy and Society and Trust and Trustworthiness.

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