A01=Nicolaus Tideman
advanced collective decision mechanisms
advocates
arrow
Arrow impossibility theorem
Arrow Theorem
Arrow's Work
Arrow’s Work
Author_Nicolaus Tideman
Bergson Samuelson Social Welfare Function
Category=JMH
Category=JPP
Category=KCP
Clarke Taxes
Collective Decision Procedure
Collective Decisions
Cumulative Voting
disinterested
Disinterested Judges
domain
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
gibbard
Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem
Majority Consistency
Majority Rule Equilibrium
Material Equality
Maximin Rule
Paired Comparison
Pareto Improvement
preference aggregation
Procedural Efficiency
procedure
proportional representation systems
satterthwaite
self-interested
Self-interested Advocates
Single Peaked Preferences
Smith Set
social choice theory
Social Welfare Function
Strategic Voting
strategic voting analysis
Symbolic Equality
theorem
universal
Universal Domain
voting paradoxes
Voting Procedure
Winning Option
Product details
- ISBN 9780754647171
- Weight: 830g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 28 Nov 2006
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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When one thinks about how collective decisions are made, voting is the method that comes naturally to mind. But other methods such as random process and consensus are also used. This book explores just what a collective decision is, classifies the methods of making collective decisions, and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Classification is the prelude to evaluation. What are the characteristics of a method of making collective decisions, the book asks, that permit us to describe a collective decision as good? The second part of the book is detailed exploration of voting: the dimensions in which voting situations differ, the origins and logic of majority rule, the frequency of cycles in voting, the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, criteria for ways of cutting through cycles and the application of these criteria to a variety of rules, voting over continuums, proportional representation, and voting rules that take account of intensities of preferences. Relatively unknown methods of voting give voting a much greater potential than is generally recognized. Collective Decisions and Voting is essential reading for everyone with an interest in voting theory and in how public choices might be made.
Nicolaus Tideman is Professor of Economics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, in Blacksburg, Virginia, USA. He has been there since 1973, as a post-doctoral fellow, Associate Professor, and Professor since 1985. He has published many professional articles, primarily in the areas of urban economics, public finance, efficient public decision-making, and economic justice.
