Abyssinian Crisis
Anglo-German Naval Accord
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
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ethiopian
Ethiopian Crisis
European Neutrals
Francine McKenzie
Gaynor Johnson
Geoffrey T. Waddington
Germany's International Position
Germany’s International Position
Haile Selassie
Hoare Laval Pact
Hoare Laval Plan
Hoare Laval Proposals
Ian S. Spears
Italian Aggression
Italian Delegates
Italian Diplomats
italo
Italo Abyssinian
Italo Abyssinian Conflict
Italo Abyssinian Dispute
Italo Abyssinian War
Italo Ethiopian Conflict
Italo Ethiopian Dispute
Italo Ethiopian War
Italo German Relations
J. Calvitt Clarke
Martin Thomas
Neutrality Legislation
Nicolas G. Virtue
Oil Sanctions
Remco van Diepen
Steven Morewood
Stresa Front
W. Neville Sloane
war
Younger Man
Product details
- ISBN 9781138704435
- Weight: 740g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 06 Feb 2017
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 marked a turning point in interwar Europe. The last great European colonial conquest in Africa, the conflict represented an enormous gamble for the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini. He faced a challenge not only from a stout Ethiopian defence, but also from difficult logistics made worse by the League of Nations' half-hearted sanctions. Mussolini faced down this opposition, and Italian troops, aided by air superiority and liberal use of yprite gas, conquered Addis Ababa within eight months, a victory that shocked many military observers of the time with its speed and suddenness. The invasion had enormous repercussions on European international relations. In the midst of a national election campaign, the British National Government had felt constrained to support the League, despite fears that sanctions through the League could lead to war with Italy. The concentration of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea alienated Mussolini and placed the French government on the horns of dilemma; should France support its military partner, Italy, or its more important potential ally, Great Britain? French attempts to mark out a middle ground did little to placate the Duce, and the crisis seemed to develop a deep rift between Fascist Italy and the Anglo-French democracies, while at the same time creating a crisis in Anglo-French relations. Mussolini turned towards Nazi Germany in an attempt to end his diplomatic isolation during the sanctions episode, although Hitler considered the Duce's friendship a mixed blessing. The question of American adherence to sanctions increased ill will between British politicians and the Roosevelt administration in Washington, as each tended to blame the other for the failure of oil sanctions and the collapse of collective security. The international crisis posed similarly thorny problems for the smaller powers of Europe, and for Japan and the Soviet Union. The crisis impeded common defence against Fascist expansionism while giving impetus to claims of the revisionist powers. Despite the tremendous importance of the international crisis, however, little new work on the subject has appeared in recent decades. In this volume, an international cast of contributors take a fresh look at the crisis through the lens of new evidence and new approaches to international relations history to provide the most comprehensive coverage of the crisis currently possible, and their work provides new frames of reference for exploring imperialism, collective security and genocide.
G. Bruce Strang is Professor of History and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Brandon University, Canada. He lives in Brandon, Manitoba, with his wife Nancy Hennen, and sons Sean and Marc. He is currently writing a monograph assessing Italian foreign policy and reconstruction in the early Cold War Era.
