A01=Barbara F. Walter
Abel Muzorewa
Arusha Accords
Author_Barbara F. Walter
Authoritarianism
Burundi
Cambodia
Case study
Category=GTU
Category=NHB
Category=NHW
Ceasefire
Civil war
Coalition government
Combatant
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Conflict resolution
Contras
Demobilization
Disarmament
Election
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Ethnic conflict
Factor
Foreign policy of the United States
Glaser
Guarantee (international law)
Guatemala
Hostility
Hutu
Implementation
Internal security
International relations
International security
Lancaster House Agreement
Legislature
Liberal democracy
Logit analysis in marketing
Michael W. Doyle
Military threat
Mozambique
Negotiation
Nicaragua
One-party state
Peace treaty
Peacebuilding
Peacekeeping
Peacemaking
Police
Probability
Provisional government
Regression analysis
Result
Rhodesia
Rhodesian Air Force
Rwanda
Rwandan Civil War
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Secession
Selection bias
Separation of powers
Social science
Strategy
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Tanzania
Ted Robert Gurr
Total war
Treaty
Tutsi
Uganda
United Nations peacekeeping
United States
War
Writing
Zimbabwe
Zoli
Product details
- ISBN 9780691089317
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 15 Jan 2002
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Why do some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others are fought to the finish? Numerous competing theories address this question. Yet not until now has a study combined the historical sweep, empirical richness, and conceptual rigor necessary to put them thoroughly to the test and draw lessons invaluable to students, scholars, and policymakers. Using data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1992, Barbara Walter details the conditions that lead combatants to partake in what she defines as a three-step process--the decision on whether to initiate negotiations, to compromise, and, finally, to implement any resulting terms. Her key finding: rarely are such conflicts resolved without active third-party intervention. Walter argues that for negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must clear the much higher hurdle of designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement--something that is difficult without outside assistance.
Examining conflicts from Greece to Laos, China to Columbia, Bosnia to Rwanda, Walter confirms just how crucial the prospect of third-party security guarantees and effective power-sharing pacts can be--and that adversaries do, in fact, consider such factors in deciding whether to negotiate or fight. While taking many other variables into account and acknowledging that third parties must also weigh the costs and benefits of involvement in civil war resolution, this study reveals not only how peace is possible, but probable.
Barbara F. Walter is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. She is the coeditor of Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention.
