Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Regular price
€142.99
A01=Dan Levin
A01=John H. Kagel
Accounting rate of return
Auction
Auction Market
Auction theory
Author_Dan Levin
Author_John H. Kagel
Average Price
Bankruptcy
Bargaining
Bargaining power
Bayesian
Bias of an estimator
Bid bond
Bid price
Bidding
Bribery
Call for bids
Cash Bonus
Category=KC
Category=KNP
Censoring (statistics)
Collusion
Commodity
Common value auction
Competition law
Current Price
Discount function
Discounting
Dummy variable (statistics)
Dutch auction
Economic indicator
Economic rent
Economics
English auction
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Error term
Expected loss
Expected value
Expense
Externality
Information asymmetry
Information economics
Investment
Investor
Likelihood-ratio test
Limited liability
Marginal cost
Market impact
Market maker
Market mechanism
Market price
Market value
Nash equilibrium
Nuisance parameter
Opportunity cost
Option value (cost–benefit analysis)
Preference (economics)
Price discrimination
Rate of return
Real versus nominal value (economics)
Recession
Reseller
Revenue
Risk aversion
Risk premium
Royalty payment
Selection bias
Spectrum auction
Tax
Test market
Total cost
Trade-off
Unrealized Gain
Vickrey auction
Winner's curse
Product details
- ISBN 9780691016672
- Weight: 794g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 11 Aug 2002
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world.
The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
John H. Kagel is University Chaired Professor of Economics at Ohio State University. A leading economic theorist, he is coeditor of, and a contributor to, "The Handbook of Experimental Economics" (Princeton). Dan Levin is Professor of Economics and Joan Huber Fellow at Ohio State University. He has published numerous articles on competitive bidding and industrial organization in leading economic journals.
