Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism

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administrative efficiency
allocation
anti-fraud governance
Anti-fraud Unit
bureaucratic rationalisation
Category=JPS
Category=JPZ
clientelist
clientelistic
Clientelistic Networks
comparative political corruption studies
Corrupt Exchange
Cosa Nostra
DC Faction
decentralisation policy
diet
electoral reform analysis
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
exchange
Grand Corruption
Interest Group Linked
interest group politics
La Repubblica
LDP
LDP Politician
Mainstream Factions
members
minimal
Minimal Winning Coalition
network
Non-mainstream Factions
Pe Rc
Plurality Rule
Political Clientelism
Political Corruption
Political Parties
portfolio
Portfolio Allocation
practices
Public Administration
Reformist Era
Single Member Districts
Socio-economic Development
Socioeconomic Development
Van Buitenen

Product details

  • ISBN 9780754643562
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 28 Mar 2006
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume.
Junichi Kawata is Professor of Political Science in the Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University, Osaka, Japan.