Concept and Object

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A01=Anthony Palmer
Ab Esse Ad Posse Valet
analytic philosophy
anti-psychologism
arguments
artificial intelligence
artificial intelligence critique
Associationist Psychology
Author_Anthony Palmer
Bradley's Problem
Bradley's Regress
Bradley’s Problem
Bradley’s Regress
Category=QD
Category=QDTL
Category=QDTM
conceptual investigations
Conditional Stroke
Davidson's Solution
Davidson’s Solution
deduction
Elementary Propositions
Empirical Semantics
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
existence
formal logic
Frege's Contextual Principle
Frege’s Contextual Principle
Incomplete Expressions
Incomplete Symbol
Indian record
inductive
inference
Judgeable Content
language
linguistic categories
logical atomism
Logical Subject
logical theory
Mere Bodily Movements
metaphysics
Mind Brain Identity Thesis
Modality
necessity
philosophy of language
predictive
probability
proof
Property Wisdom
Propositional Constituents
Propositional Function
psychologism
rationality
reasoning
Reductio Ad Absurdum Arguments
Russell's Definition
Russell’s Definition
Ryle's Work
Ryle’s Work
statements
statistical
truth
Truth Predicate
twentieth-century philosophy
unity of proposition in twentieth-century logic
Unrestricted Variable
validity
Variable Proposition

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367421182
  • Weight: 400g
  • Dimensions: 129 x 198mm
  • Publication Date: 12 Nov 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Originally published in 1988. This text gives a lucid account of the most distinctive and influential responses by twentieth century philosophers to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The problem first became central to twentieth-century philosophy as a result of the depsychoiogising of logic brought about by Bradley and Frege who, responding to the ’Psychologism’ of Mill and Hume, drew a sharp distinction between the province of psychology and the province of logic.

This author argues that while Russell, Ryle and Davidson, each in different ways, attempted a theoretical solution, Frege and Wittgenstein (both in the Tractatus and the Investigations) rightly maintained that no theoretical solution is possible. It is this which explains the importance Wittgenstein attached in his later work to the idea of agreement in judgments. The two final chapters illustrate the way in which a response to the problem affects the way in which we think about the nature of the mind. They contain a discussion of Strawson’s concept of a person and provide a striking critique of the philosophical claims made by devotees of artificial intelligence, in particular those made by Daniel Dennett.

Palmer\, Anthony

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