A01=Catherine Z. Elgin
Ad hoc
Ambiguity
Ascription
Author_Catherine Z. Elgin
Begging the question
Category=QDTK
Causality
Circular reasoning
Coherentism
Concept
Concurrence
Consideration
Constant conjunction
Controversy
Creation myth
Delusion
Distrust
Dualism (philosophy of mind)
Emotivism
Epistemic virtue
Epistemology
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Explanatory power
Extrapolation
Fallibilism
Falsity
Family resemblance
Foundationalism
Good and evil
Heuristic
Hilary Putnam
Holism
Hypothesis
Idealism
Idealization
Implicature
Indication (medicine)
Inductive reasoning
Ineffability
Inference
Inquiry
Irrationality
Just-so story
Know-how
Language game
Luck
Metaphor
Nominalism
Nonbeliever
Normal science
Overreaction
Paradox
Philosopher
Philosophy
Platitude
Presupposition
Principle of charity
Reason
Relativism
Scientism
Self-deception
Sentimentality
Skepticism
Sophistication
Special pleading
Subjectivism
Theory
Thought
Understanding
Utterance
Validity
Wishful thinking
Working hypothesis
Product details
- ISBN 9780691005232
- Weight: 369g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 21 Feb 1999
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns. Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic.
Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview--one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief.
Catherine Z. Elgin is Professor of the Philosophy of Education at Harvard University. Her books include With Reference to Reference and Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. She coauthored Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences with Nelson Goodman.
