Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
Regular price
€51.99
14 days return policy
Shipping & Delivery
A01=Steve Weber
Anti-ballistic missile
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Anti-satellite weapon
Arms control
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Author_Steve Weber
Balance of terror
Bribery
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Category=JPS
Counterforce
Defection
Defense Science Board
Disarmament
Economy of the Soviet Union
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Federation of American Scientists
Foreign policy
Foreign relations
Hypothesis
Institution
International Monetary Fund
International regime
International relations
International relations theory
International trade
Leonid Brezhnev
Melvin Laird
Mikhail Gorbachev
Militarisation of space
Military capability
Military communications
Military doctrine
Military intelligence
Military operation
Military satellite
Military strategy
Military threat
Missile defense
Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
Mutual assured destruction
National Intelligence Estimate
Nikita Khrushchev
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear weapon
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War
Politburo
Politics
Russia and weapons of mass destruction
Security dilemma
Security interest
Self-interest
Soviet Armed Forces
Soviet Military Power
Soviet Navy
Soviet Union
Soviet Union–United States relations
Strategic Missile Troops
Superiority (short story)
Technology
Theory of International Politics
Treaty
Uncertainty
United States Department of State
United States Intelligence Community
United States Secretary of Defense
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
War
Weapon of mass destruction
Weapon system
World Politics
Yuri Andropov
Product details
- ISBN 9780691604367
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 14 Jul 2014
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control...An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
