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A01=Abdullahi Dahir Ahmed
A01=Gilbert Amahoro Ndayisaba
agency theory
Australian Security and Investment Commission
Australian stock exchange
Author_Abdullahi Dahir Ahmed
Author_Gilbert Amahoro Ndayisaba
Category=KFCF
Category=KFFH
Category=KFFM
Category=KJC
Category=KJMV
Earnings per share (EPS)
Employee equity incentive plans
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
executive compensation
financial economics research
Incentive pay-repurchases link
incentive-driven stock repurchases
payout policy Australia
risk-averse employees
signalling theory
Structural equation modeling (SEM)

Product details

  • ISBN 9781032131160
  • Weight: 380g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 27 May 2025
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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This book integrates elements from agency theory and signalling theory and draws upon recent changes in the Australian payout policy and incentives pay for risk-averse employees to provide theoretical and empirical analyses that explain the paradox of the popularity of on-market stock buyback activities in a market environment characterised by reasonably high share prices.

The authors utilise a dynamic model that rationalises this paradox, which is divided into three components. The first component predicts that executives may be conducting on-market stock buyback programmes (SBPs) to adjust equity-based remuneration for risk-averse employees, thereby motivating their performance without granting them additional costly equity incentive plans (EIPs); the second component predicts that companies are likely to invest in SBPs to increase the ownership stakes of employees in the firm, thereby inducing risk-averse employees to increase their productivity which increases firm value; while the third component predicts that shareholders would benefit from incentives-induced buybacks if a firm’s opportunity cost of funds spent on buybacks is less than its inverse price-to-earnings ratio.

The authors’ findings highlight differences in the market responses towards announced repurchase motives, implying that not all incentives-induced buybacks are value-destructive buybacks. Specifically, the widespread assumption that SBPs stifle investments in human and capital stock may be subjective as the findings show that incentives-induced buybacks may be value-creative or value-destructive depending on share repurchase motives of SBPs.

This book will be a useful guide for scholars and researchers of finance, corporate finance, financial economics and financial accounting.

Gilbert Amahoro Ndayisaba is a Lecturer in finance and accounting at the School of Accounting, Information Systems and Supply Chain, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.

Abdullahi Dahir Ahmed is a Professor in Wealth Management and Head of the Department of Financial Planning and Tax at the School of Accounting, Information Systems and Supply Chain, College of Business and Law, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.

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