Counterinsurgency, Security Forces, and the Identification Problem

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A01=Daniel L. Magruder
A01=Jr Magruder
Author_Daniel L. Magruder
Author_Jr Magruder
Category=GTU
Category=JPS
Category=JWLP
Central Luzon
civil-military relations
civilian protection strategies
Civilian Safety
Civilian Victimization
Coercive Interrogation Techniques
Coin Approach
Combined Action Program
Cord
counterinsurgency
Credible Commitment
Daniel L. Magruder
empirical counterinsurgency research
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Huk Leader
Huk Movement
Huk Rebellion
Identification Problem
identifying militants
Indiscriminate Violence
insurgent detection
Intelligence Bureaucracy
Iraq war
ISR Asset
ISR Platform
Jr
Laser Guided Bombs
military case studies
Non-coercive Techniques
population collaboration
postwar conflict analysis
Raiding Approach
Risk Acceptant Behavior
Scout Ranger
Security Force Behavior
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
US military interventions
Vietnam war
Voluntary Collaboration
Young Men

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138705128
  • Weight: 600g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 14 Jul 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book presents a theory and empirical evidence for how security forces can identify militant suspects during counterinsurgency operations.

A major oversight on the part of academics and practitioners has been to ignore the critical antecedent issue common to persuasion and coercion counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches: distinguishing friend from foe. This book proposes that the behaviour of security forces influences the likelihood of militant identification during a COIN campaign, and argues that security forces must respect civilian safety in order to create a credible commitment to facilitate collaboration with a population. This distinction is important as conventional wisdom has wrongly assumed that the presence of security forces confers control over terrain or influence over a population. Collaboration between civilian and government actors is the key observable indicator of support in COIN. Paradoxically, this theory accounts for why and how increased risk to government forces in the short term actually improves civilian security in the long run. Counterinsurgency, Security Forces, and the Identification Problem draws on three case studies: the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines post-World War II; Marines Corps’ experiences in Vietnam through the Combined Action Program; and Special Operations activities in Iraq after 2003. For military practitioners, the work illustrates the critical precursor to establishing "security" during counterinsurgency operations. The book also examines the role and limits of modern technology in solving the identification problem.

This book will be of interest to students of counterinsurgency, military history, strategic studies, US foreign policy, and security studies in general.

Daniel L. Magruder, Jr holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago, USA, and is currently Commander, 22nd Special Tactics Squadron, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Dupont, Wasington, USA.

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