A01=David F. Rutgers
alfred mccormack
Author_David F. Rutgers
Category=JPQ
Category=JPSH
Category=JWKF
Category=NHK
central intelligence group
cia
dean acheson
emergence of central intelligence
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
fbi
federal bureau of investigation
Henry Adams Prize
hoyt vandenberg
intelligence advisory board
james byrnes
james forrestal
national intelligence authority
office of strategic services
oss
sidney souers
war department
william j donovan
Product details
- ISBN 9780700610242
- Weight: 545g
- Dimensions: 158 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 05 Jul 2000
- Publisher: University Press of Kansas
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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An account of the creation of the CIA that reveals how the idea of ""centralized intelligence"" developed within the government and debunks the myth that former OSS chief William J. Donovan was the prime mover behind the agency's founding. The book locates the CIA's origins in government-wide efforts to reorganize national security during the transition from World War II to the Cold War. The author believes that the creation of the CIA was not merely the brainchild of ""Wild Bill"" Donovan. Rather, it was the culmination of years of negotiation among numerous policy makers such as James Forrestal and Dean Acheson, each with strong opinions regarding the agency's mission and methods. He shows that Congress, State and Justice Departments, Joint Chiefs and even the Bureau of the Budget all had a hand in the establishment of this ""secret state"" that operates nearly invisibly outside the American political process. Based almost entirely on archival and other primary sources, the book describes in detail how the CIA evolved from its original purpose - as a watchdog to guard against a ""nuclear Pearl Harbor"" - to the role of clandestine warriors countering Soviet subversion, eventually engaging in more forms of intelligence gathering and covert operations than any of its counterparts. It suggests how the agency became a different organization than it might have been without the Communist threat, and also shows how it both overexaggerated the dangers of the Cold War and failed to predict its ending.
