David Hume on Miracles, Evidence, and Probability
Regular price
€102.99
14 days return policy
Shipping & Delivery
A01=William L. Vanderburgh
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Author_William L. Vanderburgh
automatic-update
Bayesian probability
Bayesianism
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HP
Category=HPCF3
Category=HPK
Category=HRAB
Category=QD
Category=QDHR5
Category=QDTK
Category=QRAB
COP=United States
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
early modern philosophy
eighteenth-century studies
empiricism
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
epistemic probability
epistemic voluntarism
epistemology
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
evidence
history and philosophy of science
history of philosophy
induction
John Locke
Language_English
laws of nature
PA=Available
philosophical theology
philosophy of religion
Price_€50 to €100
probability theory
probable reasoning
PS=Active
Roman Law
Scottish Enlightenment
skepticism
softlaunch
theology
Treatise of Human Nature
Product details
- ISBN 9781498596930
- Weight: 472g
- Dimensions: 160 x 231mm
- Publication Date: 04 Apr 2019
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
David Hume’s argument against believing in miracles has attracted nearly continuous attention from philosophers and theologians since it was first published in 1748. Hume’s many commentators, however, both pro and con, have often misunderstood key aspects of Hume’s account of evidential probability and as a result have misrepresented Hume’s argument and conclusions regarding miracles in fundamental ways. This book argues that Hume’s account of probability descends from a long and laudable tradition that goes back to ancient Roman and medieval law. That account is entirely and deliberately non-mathematical. As a result, any analysis of Hume’s argument in terms of the mathematical theory of probability is doomed to failure. Recovering the knowledge of this ancient tradition of probable reasoning leads us to a correct interpretation of Hume’s argument against miracles, enables a more accurate understanding of many other episodes in the history of science and of philosophy, and may be also useful in contemporary attempts to weigh evidence in epistemically complex situations where confirmation theory and mathematical probability theory have proven to be less helpful than we would have hoped.
William L. Vanderburgh is professor of philosophy at California State University, San Bernardino.
