A01=Robert E. Bohrer II
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Author_Robert E. Bohrer II
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Bond Yields
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Category=JHB
Central Bank Autonomy
Central Bank Independence
comparative politics
Consensus Democracy
Consensus Systems
COP=United Kingdom
De Gaulle
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Democracy
Democratic Institutional Design
democratic institutional outcomes analysis
Differences
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Fourth Republic
French Fourth Republic
Gdp Growth
Government Strength
High Bond Yields
inclusion index methodology
Inclusive Systems
Institutional
institutional analysis
Language_English
Majoritarian Systems
market volatility governance
Minimum Winning Coalitions
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
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Plurality Electoral Laws
political incentives
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Proportional Representation Electoral Laws
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public expenditure patterns
Public Sector Employment
Real Bond Yields
Rent Seeking Behavior
Single Party Majority Government
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Strategies
Strong Central Banks
Time Period Dummy Variable
Total Government Outlays
Product details
- ISBN 9781138736849
- Weight: 460g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 28 Jun 2017
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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This title was first published in 2001. This text addressses the variations in democratic institutional design and seeks to determine not only if these differences matter, but also to explain how they matter. Using data from established, economically weel-off systems, the book shows that not only are there a multitude of ways to construct a democracy but also how a democracy is constructed influences the outcomes produced by that system. That is to say, institutional differences create distinct incentives for behaviour that in turn influence the type of outcome produced.
