A01=Daniel Verdier
Advocacy group
Amendment
Author_Daniel Verdier
Behalf
Big business
Capitalism
Category=JPHV
Category=KCLT
Category=KCP
Coalition government
Communism
Competition
Consideration
Corporatism
Currency
Drawback
Economics
Economy
Election
Employment
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Expense
Export
Externality
Factors of production
Foreign policy
Free trade
Ideology
Imperial Preference
Industrial policy
Inflation
Institution
International relations
Legislation
Legislature
Liberalization
Lobbying
Logrolling
Manufacturing
National security
Nationalization
Party leader
Party system
Policy
Political party
Political science
Politician
Politics
Pressure politics
Price fixing
Protectionism
Ratification
Raw material
Receipt
Recession
Regulation
Rent-seeking
Repeal
Shipbuilding
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
Subsidy
Supply (economics)
Tariff
Tax
Trade agreement
Trade association
Trade preference
Trade union
Treaty
Two-party system
Unemployment
United States Department of State
Voting
World War I
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691021034
- Weight: 595g
- Dimensions: 197 x 254mm
- Publication Date: 23 Jul 1995
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent-seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition.
Daniel Verdier is Professor of Political Science at the European University Institute, Florence.
