A Theory of Justice
A01=David Estlund
Acquiescence
Ambiguity
Analogy
Anonymity
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Attempt
Author_David Estlund
Authoritarianism
Bargaining power
Bayesian statistics
Boldness
Category=JPHV
Category=QDTS
Civil disobedience
Civility
Consent theory
Consequentialism
Consideration
Contractualism
Controversy
Cruel and unusual punishment
De facto
Deference
Deliberation
Deliberative democracy
Despotism
Disclaimer
Doctrine
Duty to rescue
Epistemic virtue
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Equal opportunity
Exoneration
Explanation
Extrapolation
Fair procedure
False advertising
Falsity
Fraud
Freedom of speech
Good faith
Groupthink
Humanitarian intervention
Impartiality
Impossibility
Inappropriateness
Inference
Institution
Irrationality
John Rawls
Legitimacy (political)
Leveling (philosophy)
Liberalism
Majority rule
Moral authority
Moral responsibility
Morality
Multitude
Natural justice
Necessary evil
Non-cognitivism
Normative
Obedience (human behavior)
Obligation
Obstructionism
Occam's razor
Open government
Opportunism
Original position
Overlapping consensus
Participant
Pessimism
Philosophical anarchism
Political Liberalism
Political philosophy
Politics
Principle
Probability
Public reason
Public sphere
Rationality
Reasonable accommodation
Reasonable person
Requirement
Result
Skepticism
Social choice theory
Stipulation
Suggestion
Supererogation
Theory
Toleration
Utilitarianism
Veil of ignorance
Veto
Voting
Product details
- ISBN 9780691143248
- Weight: 454g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 23 Aug 2009
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view.
If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.
David M. Estlund is professor of philosophy at Brown University.
