A01=Lisa L. Martin
Abuse of authority
Accountability
Activism
Aid
Anecdotal evidence
Author_Lisa L. Martin
Bipartisanship
Category=JPHV
Category=JPS
Central bank
Citizens (Spanish political party)
Coalition government
Comparative politics
Constitutional amendment
Decentralization
Democratic consolidation
Democratic deficit
Development aid
Distrust
Divided government
Domestic policy
Earl Butz
Economic power
Economic sanctions
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
European integration
Exchange of information
Executive agreement
Foreign Assistance Act
Foreign policy
Free trade
Freedom of speech
Great power
High politics
Imperial Presidency
Implementation
Indifference curve
Institution
International relations
Jackson-Vanik amendment
Legislation
Legislative history
Legislative veto
Legislator
Legislature
Liberalization
Logrolling
Member state
Military alliance
Minority government
Monopsony
Motion of no confidence
Multilateralism
National Parliament (East Timor)
National security
Neofunctionalism
North American Free Trade Agreement
Parliamentary system
Party discipline
Politician
Principal-agent problem
Ratification
Representative democracy
Semi-presidential system
Sovereignty
Subsidy
Supermajority
Supranational union
Trade barrier
Trading with the Enemy Act
Treaty
United States Department of State
Veto
Voting
Product details
- ISBN 9780691009247
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 197 x 254mm
- Publication Date: 07 May 2000
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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From the refusal of the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track trade authority and certain foreign aid packages to the obstacles placed by Western European parliaments in the path of economic integration, legislatures often interfere with national leaders' efforts to reach and implement predictable international agreements. This seems to give an advantage to dictators, who can bluff with confidence and make decisions without consultation, and many assume that even democratic governments would do better to minimize political dissent and speak foreign policy from a single mouth. In this thoughtful, empirically grounded challenge to the assumption that messy domestic politics undermine democracies' ability to conduct international relations, Lisa Martin argues that legislatures--and particularly the apparently problematic openness of their proceedings--actually serve foreign policy well by giving credibility to the international commitments that are made.
Examining the American cases of economic sanctions, the use of executive agreements versus treaties, and food assistance, in addition to the establishment of the European Union, Martin concludes that--if institutionalized--even rancorous domestic conversations between executives and legislatures augment rather than impede states' international dealings. Such interactions strengthen and legitimize states' bargaining positions and international commitments, increasing their capacity to realize international cooperation. By expanding our comprehension of how domestic politics affect international dialogue, this work is a major advance in the field of international relations and critical reading for those who study or forge foreign policy.
Lisa L. Martin is Professor of Government at Harvard University. She is the author of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton).
