Determined by Reasons

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A01=Susanne Mantel
action
action theory
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agency
Author_Susanne Mantel
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Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HPJ
Category=HPK
Category=HPM
Category=HPQ
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTM
Category=QDTQ
causal accounts
character evaluation
co-existence
COP=United Kingdom
correspondence of normative reasons and action
Davidson's Challenge
Davidson’s Challenge
Deliberative Notion
Deliberative Sense
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Descriptive Belief
Deviant Causal Chains
Dispositional Explanations
Dispositional Relations
Dispositional Structure
dispositions
Epistemic Competence
epistemic dispositions
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eq_nobargain
explanations
Explanatory Correspondence
Explanatory Notion
Explanatory Sense
Fregean Propositions
Identity Thesis
individuation
Language_English
Lucky Dog
metaethics
moral agency
moral psychology
Motivating Consideration
motivating considerations
Motivating Reasons
Non-instrumental Desire
Normative Competence
Normative Competence Account
normative notion
Normative Reason
normative reasons
normativity
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philosophy of action
philosophy of psychology
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Reason Favors
reasons
reduction
Simple Conditional Analysis
softlaunch
Susanne Mantel
Tracking Dispositions
virtue
virtue epistemology
volitional competence

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367667023
  • Weight: 380g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 30 Sep 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
  • Language: English
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This book offers a new account of what it is to act for a normative reason. The first part of the book introduces some popular ideas and problems concerning causal and dispositional approaches of acting for reasons. The author argues that the dispositional approach should take a certain form that unites epistemic, volitional, and executional dispositions in a complex normative competence. This "Normative Competence Account" allows for more and less reflective ways of acting for normative reasons. The second part of the book clarifies the relation between the normative reason that an agent acts for and his or her motivating reasons. The chapters in this part refute the widely held "identity view" that acting for a normative reason requires the normative reason to be identical with a motivating reason. The author describes how normative reasons are related to motivating reasons by a relation of correspondence, and proposes a new understanding of how normative reasons explain those actions that are performed for them. Determined by Reasons engages with current debates from a wide range of different philosophical areas, including action theory, metaethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and ontology, to develop a new account of normative reasons.

Susanne Mantel is an assistant at Saarland University. She works on metaethics, action theory, and epistemology with a focus on reasons and normativity. Her articles have been published in Erkenntnis, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Explorations, and Synthese. She received the Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preis and the Lauener Prize for Up and Coming Philosophers.

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