1991 Soviet coup d'etat attempt
A01=Leon V. Sigal
Agreed Framework
Albert Wohlstetter
Anti-Americanism
Appeasement
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Author_Leon V. Sigal
Barton Gellman
Baruch Plan
Brinkmanship
Brinkmanship (Cold War)
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Casus belli
Category=JPS
Category=JWMN
Chun Doo-hwan
Coercive diplomacy
Cold War
Containment
Covert operation
David Kay
Declaration of war
Disarmament
Disenchantment
eq_bestseller
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Foreign relations of North Korea
Gulf War
Gunboat diplomacy
Henry Kissinger
Hermit kingdom
International Atomic Energy Agency
Jimmy Carter
Korea
Korean War
Liberalism
Long War (20th century)
National security
North Korea
Nuclear disarmament
Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear umbrella
Nuclear warfare
Orwellian
Peace treaty
Peaceful coexistence
Peaceful Revolution
Preemptive war
Prelude to War
Preventive war
Pyongyang
Reprisal
Robert Gates
Rogue state
Rollback
Security assurance
South Korea
Soviet Empire
Soviet Union-United States relations
Stephen J. Solarz
Stockpile stewardship
Strategic Defense Initiative
Superiority (short story)
Team B
Team Spirit
Technical intelligence
Third World
Three Non-Nuclear Principles
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
United States Department of State
Veto
War
Warfare
What Happened
Product details
- ISBN 9780691010069
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 21 Jul 1999
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations.
Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.
Leon V. Sigal is a consultant at the Social Science Research Council in New York and Adjunct Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. A former member of The New York Times editorial board, he is also the author of Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945.
