104th United States Congress
A01=Eric Schickler
Activism
Amendment
Anti-statism
Author_Eric Schickler
Bill Clinton
Bill of rights
Bipartisanship
Budget process
Category=JPA
Category=JPH
Category=JPQ
Category=JPV
Caucus
Chairman
Cloture
Committee
Congressional Quarterly
Conservative coalition
Conservative Democrat
Constitutionalism
Decentralization
Dennis Hastert
Discharge petition
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Filibuster
Grand strategy
Hidden welfare state
Ideology
Incumbent
Individualism
Institution
Jacob Hacker
James Q. Wilson
Jim Inhofe
Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937
Jurisdiction
Legislation
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
Legislative veto
Legislator
Lobbying
Majority
Midterm election
Minimum wage
Minority leader
Multiple referral
National Journal
New institutionalism
Newt Gingrich
Party leader
Party-line vote
Path dependence
Political party
Politics
Prerogative
Princeton University Press
Republican Party (United States)
Select committee
Seniority
Seniority in the United States Senate
Social policy
Supermajority
Tariff
Tax
Term limit
The Garrison State
The Origins of the Urban Crisis
Theda Skocpol
Two-party system
Veto
Victorian America
Voting
Voting methods in deliberative assemblies
Welfare reform
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691049267
- Weight: 567g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 06 May 2001
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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From the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for members and outside observers alike. Analyzing leadership, committee, and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and Senate.
He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of American political development and history.
Eric Schickler is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkefey.
