Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

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A01=Hamid Vahid
Author_Hamid Vahid
basing relation theory
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTM
Category=QDTQ
circularity problem
cognitive penetration
competences
defeat
Deontological Justification
Deviant Causal Chains
disposition ascriptions
Dispositional Account
dispositional analysis of belief justification
Dispositional Framework
Dispositional Property
Dispositional Structure
dispositions
Doxastic Justification
epistemic basing relation
Epistemic Defeat
Epistemic Disposition
epistemic internalism
Epistemic Justification
Epistemic Reasons
Epistemically Significant
epistemology
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
evidentialism
Hamid Vahid
Higher Order Belief
Higher Order Evidence
higher-order defeat
inference
justification for belief
Justified Belief
metaethics
Motivating Reasons
motivational internalism
Narrow Scope Reading
Normative Reasons
normativity in epistemology
Perceptual Beliefs
perceptual dogmatism
perceptual entitlement
Perceptual Justification
Perceptual Reasons
Positive Epistemic Status
Propositional Justification
Rational Commitment
Red Table
representational content
self-knowledge
Tyler Burge

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367509866
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 07 Sep 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology.

In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons bears on the issues involving perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism.

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics.

Hamid Vahid is Professor of Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Iran. He is the author of Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge (2005) and The Epistemology of Belief (2009).

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