A01=Peter Liberman
Anschluss
Anti-communism
Autarky
Author_Peter Liberman
Belgians
Brezhnev Doctrine
Category=JPA
Category=JPS
Category=JW
Category=NHTQ
Cold War
Cold War (1985-91)
Collaboration with the Axis Powers during World War II
Comparative advantage
Containment
Cult of the offensive
Czechoslovakia
Dawes Plan
Dutch resistance
East Germany
Eastern Europe
Economic reconstruction
Economic stagnation
Economic warfare
Economics
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Externality
Fritz Fischer
General Government
German Order (decoration)
Germany's Aims in the First World War
Great power
Hundred Regiments Offensive
Hungarian Revolution of 1956
Imperialism
John Maynard Keynes
John Mearsheimer
John Mueller
Labour service (Hungary)
Leon Degrelle
Looting
Manchukuo
Manchuria
Military occupation
Monopsony
Neocolonialism
Occupation of the Ruhr
Opportunity cost
Orwellian
Peaceful coexistence
Pierre Laval
Police state
Prisoner of war
Protectionism
Reprisal
Revolution
Security dilemma
Shortage
Soviet Empire
Soviet Union
Stability-instability paradox
Subsidy
Superiority (short story)
Tax
The German War
The Rape of Belgium
Theory of International Politics
Total war
Trade barrier
Walther Rathenau
War
War economy
War effort
Western Europe
World War I
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691002422
- Weight: 369g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 23 Aug 1998
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance.
Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.
Peter Liberman is Associate Professor of Political Science, Queens College, City University of New York.
