Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy

Regular price €61.50
Quantity:
Ships in 10-20 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
Shipping & Delivery
A01=Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
A01=Norrin M. Ripsman
American Economic Incentives
Author_Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
Author_Norrin M. Ripsman
calculations
capacity
Category=JPS
CIA Estimate
coercive
coercive diplomacy
commercial
Commercial Liberal
comparative case studies
De Klerk
demands
domestic political insulation
Domestic Political Variables
Economic Statecraft
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Grand Apartheid
Greatest Marginal Effect
High Level Encroachments
incentives
International Conditionalist
international relations theory
Key Societal Groups
liberal
NATO Entry
NATO Expansion
NATO Membership
NATO Partnership
Neoclassical Realist Theory
political economy analysis
Potential Strategic Consequences
regime change strategies
sanctions
sanctions effectiveness in foreign policy
sender
Sender Demands
Single Member Districts
Societal Groups
South Sudan
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
target
Target State
Target State Calculations
Target State's Leadership
Target State’s Leadership

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415836319
  • Weight: 580g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 03 Jul 2015
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions.

High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards?

In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea.

This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.

Jean-Marc F. Blanchard is Assistant Dean for International Cooperation and Exchange, Professor, and Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations with the School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiaotong University. He is author/editor of five books.

Norrin M. Ripsman is Professor at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. He is author/editor of six books.

More from this author