Economics and the Theory of Games

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A01=Michael Bacharach
advanced economic modeling applications
Attainable Set
Author_Michael Bacharach
Bargaining Game
Bayesian games
Category=PB
Commodity Bundles
Competitive Equilibrium
Cooperative Game
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Equilibrium Pair
evolutionary game dynamics
Expected Utility
Feasible Distribution
Indifference Curve
Maximin Strategies
mechanism design theory
Nash equilibrium analysis
Nash Solution
Non-cooperative Equilibrium
Non-cooperative Games
NZS Game
Pareto Optimal Set
Payoff Matrix
Payoff Pair
Payoff Vector
Pure Strategy
repeated interactions
strategic decision making
Trading Game
Transferable Utility
TU Game
Utility Index
Utility Possibility Frontier
Von Neumann Morgenstern Theory

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367171742
  • Weight: 199g
  • Dimensions: 127 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 31 Oct 2022
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information, and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions. The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between evolution and rationality.

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