Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy

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argument from disagreement
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
commonsense beliefs
commonsense in philosophy
commonsense philosophy
conservatism
contextualism
David Lewis
disagreement
epistemic disagreement
epistemology
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_new_release
eq_nobargain
equilibrism
ethics of belief
grit
Janos Tozser
knockdown argument
knowledge
knowledge-first epistemology
Laszlo Kocsis
metaphilosophy
peer disagreement
philosophical methodology
philosophical progress
philosophical progress theory
Pyrrhonian skepticism
rational belief justification in philosophy
skepticism

Product details

  • ISBN 9781032843773
  • Weight: 840g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 25 May 2026
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This volume presents new perspectives on the metaphilosophical view of equilibrism. It features original contributions from leading epistemologists who specialize in metaphilosophical issues.

Philosophers have always been interested in the true nature and ultimate goals of their own enterprise. Equilibrism is a new and increasingly popular metaphilosophical vision that offers an alternative to views that are intoxicatingly optimistic or depressingly pessimistic about the purpose of philosophy. According to equilibrism, philosophers are to develop theories that are in harmony or equilibrium with their own pre-philosophical convictions. Collectively, philosophy aims at populating the logical space with consistent philosophical theories or stable equilibria. The chapters in this volume address, among others, the following questions: Can we really settle for a more modest goal than the intellectual maintenance of our respective philosophical beliefs (equilibria)? Does the intellectual maintenance of our own equilibria really entitle us to rationally hold on to their truth? If we are sympathetic to equilibrism, what doxastic attitude should we adopt toward the propositions featuring in the equilibria we Develop ? Are all our beliefs that we have turned into an equilibrium equally firm? To what extent should we care about or respect our commonsensical opinions in philosophical theorizing?

Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy will appeal to scholars and graduate students interested in metaphilosophy, the epistemology of philosophy, philosophical methodology, the ethics of belief, and metaphilosophical skepticism.

László Kocsis is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary. His research interests lie in analytic metaphysics, philosophy of science, history of analytic philosophy, epistemology, and theories of truth. He is the coeditor of Wilfrid Sellars’s Metaphilosophy: Two Images and the Philosophy in Between (Bloomsbury, 2026).
János Tőzsér is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities in Budapest, Hungary. His main research interests include philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphilosophy. He is the author of The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (Bloomsbury, 2023).