Evolution Of U.s. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 19451980

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Author_John P Rose
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Cold War defense
Enhanced Radiation Weapon
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Lower Nuclear Yields
military strategy
NATO Force
NATO Nuclear
NATO Nuclear Force
nuclear battlefield
nuclear battlefield operations
Nuclear Firepower
Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine
nuclear warfighting doctrine analysis
Pentomic Division
political influence on warfare
political preferences
Soviet Ground Forces
Soviet Military
Soviet Military Doctrine
Soviet military planning
Suppressive Fire
tactical doctrine
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
U.S. Army tactical doctrine
U.S. political authorities
United States Strategic Bombing Survey
War Time
West Germany

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367307424
  • Weight: 500g
  • Dimensions: 143 x 228mm
  • Publication Date: 31 May 2021
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.
John P. Rose received a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California and is currently on the faculty of the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

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